A New Marshall Plan for Gaza

The Arab League meeting in Cairo on March 4 intended to deliver a formal response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal for the United States to take control of Gaza and relocate its Palestinian population to other countries, including Egypt and Jordan. In their final communique, Arab leaders condemned Israel for the destruction of Gaza; demanded full implementation of the cease-fire agreement, including an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; and insisted that the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital was critical for regional peace and security.

Hamas, the de facto authority in Gaza and which orchestrated the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, was not mentioned by name in the communiqué. Instead, the report envisions the creation of a transitional administration in Gaza, under Palestinian Authority auspices and international peacekeeping troops, to ensure security for Palestinians and Israelis. The Arab League approved a $53 billion reconstruction plan for Gaza, which has already been criticized by Israel and the United States for failing to address the removal of Hamas as a military and political force in Gaza.

Since Oct. 7, various appeals have been made about the need for a new Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. Most recently, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal told Al Arabiya News: “They can think of doing Gaza along [the lines of] the Marshall Plan in Europe after the Second World War. America rebuilt the whole continent, let alone this small strip of Gaza. The people stayed in place—they didn’t move the Europeans out of Europe in order to build that.”

This comparison is flawed as it ignores key historical differences. Unlike Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, which surrendered and accepted new governance, Hamas, despite being degraded by the Israeli military, remains in full control of what remains in Gaza. Hamas has not surrendered and continues to hold 59 hostages, 35 of whom are believed to be dead. Additionally, there is no clear indication that Gaza’s population is pressuring Hamas to step down, raising doubts about the viability of large-scale reconstruction under current conditions.

While it is prudent to think about a post-Gaza reality, the success of any reconstruction effort modeled after the Marshall Plan, which rebuilt Europe post-World War II, must satisfy at minimum two critical requirements: successful implementation of the cease-fire agreements between Israel and Hamas and clear and unambiguous commitments by Hamas that it will demilitarize, step down from power in Gaza, and vow not to undermine any new Palestinian administration in Gaza. Without addressing these fundamental issues, any aid will only perpetuate a cycle of destruction and reconstruction, failing to establish long-term stability.

Any Arab-led comprehensive reconstruction plan must be contingent upon Hamas and Israel successfully complying with and implementing the cease-fire agreement. Brokered on Jan. 19, the cease-fire agreement consists of three phases, each lasting 42 days. Fulfilling all three phases, let alone entering the second phase—negotiations for which stalled in March—is not a foregone conclusion. Neither Israel nor Hamas has reached agreed-upon terms to enter the second phase, with an understanding that it will ultimately conclude with an end to the war.

Indeed, despite intense mediation by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, the cease-fire remains very fragile. Hamas accused Israel of violating the agreement on March 18 after Israel launched airstrikes across Gaza, the largest since the start of the cease-fire, killing more than 400 Palestinians. The Israeli military characterized the strikes as “preemptive” based on Hamas’s ability to rearm and its refusal to release more hostages.

Following Israel’s strikes, Egypt proposed a plan to guide the way to a renewed cease-fire in the short term, including hostage return in exchange for a pause in fighting, allowing humanitarian aid into Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.

Looking forward, the Egyptian plan endorsed at the Cairo summit emphasized the need to prioritize full implementation of the cease-fire but singled out Israel to satisfy all requirements. The plan did not mention Hamas by name, let alone specify what Hamas needs to do.

Successful implementation of the cease-fire by both Hamas and Israel must go hand in hand with addressing the future role of Hamas in Gaza. Any Arab-led reconstruction plan must include the complete demilitarization of Hamas and the establishment of a legitimate and nonviolent governing authority.

The international community must not repeat past mistakes where aid was funneled into Gaza without adequate oversight, allowing Hamas to divert resources for its own military buildup. Instead, the framework for rebuilding must be tied to clear objectives, including security, governance reform, economic development, and international oversight.

First, security and demilitarization are nonnegotiable. Hamas has repeatedly undermined peace efforts by using its control of Gaza to launch attacks on Israel and suppress opposition. A successful reconstruction initiative must involve the dismantling of Hamas’s military infrastructure, the disarmament of its factions, and the creation of an independent security force under international supervision.

The Cairo communique did not mention disarming Hamas. Instead, the adopted Egyptian plan calls for the creation of a Palestinian technocratic regime in Gaza as an interim step toward the eventual return of the PA to administer Gaza. Egypt and Jordan have committed to training Palestinian police forces and stationing them in Gaza. Additionally, both nations have urged the United Nations Security Council to contemplate approving a peacekeeping operation to manage governance in Gaza until the rebuilding process is finalized.

Unfortunately, the Egyptian plan creates more questions than answers, and there are no quick or easy solutions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel does not want to reoccupy Gaza, but he has also denounced calls for a reformed PA to administer the strip—and his defense minister has threatened to permanently seize parts of it. The PA may be the least bad realistic option to take control to ensure a smooth transition of administrative power from Hamas, but it requires significant reform.

Historically plagued by corruption and inefficiency, the PA must undergo structural changes to ensure transparency and effectiveness in governing Gaza. A technocratic administration, supported and endorsed by international actors including the Egyptians, Jordanians, and Saudis, should oversee the transition. A viable governance structure should also include local stakeholders and tribal leaders to ensure broad-based support and legitimacy within Gaza.

The Egyptian plan’s omission of Hamas’s disarmament as a requirement for reconstruction is the most problematic oversight. As long as Hamas has a monopoly over the use of force in Gaza, it will continue to threaten the security of both Gaza and Israel. The plan’s preference for an interim regime raises the question of who would oversee dismantling Hamas’s extensive tunnel networks and hidden arsenals, as required to ensure long-term compliance.

Ignoring such a well-known security risk that threatens the success of a multibillion-dollar reconstruction effort is dangerously foolish. It is not enough to merely hope and wish that Hamas willingly agrees to step down from power and respect a transitional regime in Gaza as well as commits to nonviolence.

Despite these hurdles, there is room for some optimism. U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff described the Arab League plan as a “good-faith first step.” Yet unless Israel and Hamas can successfully reach the final state of the cease-fire agreement, culminating in Hamas stepping down from power and disarming, the prospect of creating a new Marshall Plan will remain an elusive dream.