Albert Mathiez: "Robespierre."

Translation of "Le carnet de Robespierre" by Albert Mathiez.

1. For several years. 2. Deleatur. 3. To [be] correct[ed]. 4. To [be] retrench[ed]. 5. To [be] examine[d]. 6. Wrong. 7. To [be] explain[ed]. 8. To [be] explain[ed]. 9. Their perils. 10. Danton showed himself well (1). The mission of Fabre beside Dumouriez (2). His brother [is] praised in the letters of Dumouriez (3). 11. The journey of Chaumette in the Nièvre, where the religious intrigue began, where the society of Moulins, by an insolent address, censures the decree of the Convention on the freedom of worship, and praises the principles of Hébert and of Chaumette (4). Fabre also slipped into the religious intrigue (5); he produced an honourable reference to the first acts who were made on this subject (6), and rose against this system by talking to patriots (7). 12. Everything is rendered guilty of all these crimes at the same time (8). The plan of Fabre and of his accomplices was to seize power and to oppress liberty by aristocracy in order to give France a tyrant (9). There was a faction which Fabre knew perfectly: it was the one of Hébert, Proli, Ronsin. This faction was the fulcrum which Fabre wanted to give to his; as it displayed the banner of the most exalted patriotism, by attacking it (10), he hoped to discredit patriotism, to stop the revolutionary measures and to push the Convention to the contrary, to moderantism and aristocracy. As the leaders of this faction meddled with ardent patriots, by striking them, he intended to slaughter the patriotes at the same time, above all those who had been suspected of having had some relations with them (11), above all those who had important public functions [contributing] to the success of the Revolution (12). However, Fabre didn't denounce the conspiracy with energy, he attacked some individuals rather lightly, without demasking the faction; he didn't attack the former, et didn't deliver them the strongest blows (13); he prefered to put forward some men who he moved (14). This [means] that a conspirator cannot uncover (15) the background of a conspiracy without denouncing himself. His reputation was so hideous and his crimes [were] so known (16) that he was exposed to rejoinders [that were] too terrible from the part of his opponents, whereas he had fought them without unceremoniously, and whereas he had forbidden the means to rally their partisans to his own faction. One might be tempted to believe that he didn't get along with them so bad that he wanted to show this; because he attacked them in order to lift their credit (17). He only enunciated vague and careful facts against them, when he could reproach them for crimes. They enjoyed a reputation of patriotism and he made them confess abruptly [when they were] under arrest by a decree [that was] poorly motivated, and which seemed [to have been] dictated by passion and discredited by the renown of those who had provoked it (18). The prisoners seemed to be ardent patriots, oppressed by intriguers who wore the colours of moderantism. Could one serve conspirators better, on the eve of using their attacks? One had promised facts against them (19). The Committee of General Security waited for them in vain for nearly two months. When (20) he made his report, Fabre had seemed to step down from his denunciation: Danton justified them, by reserving for himself the right to (21) show the same indulgence for their opponents, that is to say for Chabot and his accomplices and particularly for Fabre, his friend (22). It was not, in fact, to the conspirators that Fabre held a grudge against directly: it was against the true patriots and against the Committee of Public Safety, which he wanted to seize (23) with his adherents.

History of European Ideas, 2015

..... The authors demonstrate the complex web of nineteenth-century French political contexts that gave birth to the theory, or rather, theories, of ‘bourgeois revolution’ and in which the man-concept named Robespierre was appropriated by various political positions, forming a relation of mutual feedback between historical view and contemporary action. For the republicans and the socialists of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, their respective prospect of future ideal society necessitated a reinterpretation of Robespierre and the French Revolution. It was regarded as a ‘bourgeois revolution’ from the very beginning (e.g., by Barnave) and its early afterlife (e.g., by Guizot), but the precise meaning and the political implication of the term remained volatile. Recently the term has been engaged in another battle between the advocates of the consciousness of the historical actors and those of the unpredictability of historical outcome and its discordance with original intentions; for the moment, the stake of the term has been scaled down to the latter position in order to keep the word as an analytical term, its strong claims of being a ‘precursor’ to a socialist revolution now brushed aside. The book shows that the view on Robespierre has been changing in tandem with the future-oriented stake of the ‘bourgeois revolution’ or with the strategy to realise sociopolitical transitions. This renders the well-known twentieth-century ‘trench warfare’ between the school of Lefebvre and that of Cobban, and most of all between those of Soboul and of Furet more deeply comprehensible. It is clear from Belissa and Bosc's book that from 1794 up to the present day, there has been no one Robespierre, no one positive or one negative view of Robespierre, no one Robespierre the demonic dictator or one Robespierre the revolutionary hero. There have always been so many ‘Robespierres’ even within the positive and within the negative—as it may well be that they will live on, the book is a timely contribution to the long historiography of the French Revolution and its most (in)famous protagonist.

Published on H-France Salon, Volume 7 (2015), Issue 14, at: http://www.h-france.net/Salon/Lintonedited.pdf

1999

Robespierre's politics have often been seen as synonymous with the Revolution itself. He encapsulated what was best-and worst -about the Revolution. He was a tireless advocate for liberty and equality, yet to defend these principles he was prepared to adopt the Terror.