BOLETIM DE CONJUNTURA ISSN: 2525-5266 NERINT BOLETIM DE CONJUNTURA NERINT volume 3 | número 9 | abril - junho 2018 BOLETIM DE CONJUNTURA NERINT SUMMARY AmEricAn ForEign Policy undEr trumP: thE EurAsiAn AgEndA 55 Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo and Joana Soares Cordeiro Lopes An irAn in thE middlE oF thE PAthwAy 65 Rafaela Elmir Fioreze and Paulo Fagundes Visentini thE xi JinPing govErnmEnt And thE Evolution oF chinA’s ForEign rElAtions in AsiA 76 Erik Herejk Ribeiro and Magnus Kenji Hiraiwa bEyond russiA’s dEvEloPmEnt oF nEw wEAPons: insights From militAry innovAtion And EmulAtion thEory Augusto César Dall’Agnol and Eduardo Tomankievicz Secchi Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.3 n. 9 | p. 1-99 | abr - jun/2018 | ISSN: 2525-5266 91 bEyond russiA’s dEvEloPmEnt oF nEw wEAPons: insights From militAry innovAtion And EmulAtion thEory Augusto César Dall’Agnol1 and Eduardo Tomankievicz Secchi2 • Putin’s description of the new weapon systems on its address to the Federal Assembly, in March 1st 2018, is aimed to dissuade the U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy. • The focus of Russian strategic modernization is to keep the status quo of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) with U.S. • The possibility of creation of an arms-control regime between U.S and Russia is impaired due Russian concerns of American disrespect for previous efforts. Presentation On March 1st, 2018 Putin made its yearly statement at the Federal Assembly of Russia. The reactions of international specialist were diverse, mostly because of the emphasis given in the address to the new line of weaponry developed by the country: hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles nuclear-powered, undersea drones nucleararmed and nuclear-powered, and other diversity of equipment were presented to the world. The major discussion between those scholars is related to the responsibility, both of Russia and the U.S., in possibly triggering another arms race. Most analysis focus on a short-term view of the events, especially on empirical facts and, therefore, lacking a theoretical frame to evaluate the situation. resulted in the precipitation of this new competition, using theories that embrace internal balancing, military emulation, innovation and offsetting. Our focus is then, less a description of what was addressed by Putin, and more a theoretical review of the impacts of the deployment of such weaponry for the international politics. The article is organized as followed: in the irst section we debate what was said by Putin in his statement and how it intersects with the theories chosen. Then we present, in the next section, the theoretical frame that was used to base our analysis. The third part focus on the debate of what were the empirical facts that led to a shift in the external level of threat to Russia, seeking to This paper seeks to understand the dynamics that comprehend the Russian motivations to develop 1 Master’s student in International Strategic Studies Program at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Graduate Researcher at Study Group of State Capacity, Security and Defense (GECAP - UFSM). CAPES scholarship. E-mail: a.agnol@gmail.com. 2 Fourth-Year Undergraduate Student of International Relations at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul and researcher at the Brazilian Study Group of Strategy and International Relations (NERINT- UFRGS). E-mail: eduardotsecchi@hotmail.com. 91 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.3 n. 9 | p. 1-99 | abr - jun/2018 | ISSN: 2525-5266 this new type of weapons. new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclearpowered, undersea autonomous torpedo” (U.S. 2018b, 9). Despite some of this equipment is being presented as high-end modernity technology, some of these concepts have already been studied, the nuclear-powered ICBM being the case, but the lack of technology available not allowing (Fitzpatrick 2018). Putin’s Address to the Federal Assembly Putin divided its statement in two parts and dedicated one hour each. The irst one was committed to economic reforms and social programs3 that were being implemented. The second part, focused on military policy and its strategic component is our spotlight. The president described and showed videos of four systems with nuclear capacity, some still in developmentphase, being two of them hypersonic-capable4 – and not being covered by the START III5 (2010) or the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) (1987). The hypersonic systems, however, postulate new challenges to the global security9. Their enormous ability to deny defense systems using high speeds and maneuverability can present itself in a disruptive way for the military doctrines of the most developed nations. Their irregular light pattern and the wide range of cruise altitudes annul the defense systems deployed today almost in their fullness (Speier 2017). The mentioned systems include: (i) the Avangard hypersonic vehicle; (ii) the Kinzhal hypersonic airlaunched missile; (iii) an undersea drone; and (iv) an intercontinental cruise missile groundbased. The Avangard will be launched from an ICBM6 and can “glide” over the target in extremely high-speeds, being allowed to overthrow defense systems. In turn, the Kinzhal is an air-land missile, noticing a complementarity on both projects. The “unnamed” drone operates like a nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered long-range torpedo with very low possibility of detection. The last system is an ICBM armed with multiple nuclear warheads, but also nuclear-powered7 (Pifer 2018). Putin stressed, in his statement, that Russia has the capability of the nuclear-powered ICBM, being able to overcome any defense system existent. The announcement made by the president referring to this equipment came right after the review of nuclear policy (NPR). made by the Pentagon, at the request of Trump. The timing of the advertisement was planned in response to the U.S. acts, though, the development of this technologies wasn’t done overnight, neither was based on Trump recent attitudes. These projects are a Russian response to the initiatives and policies made by the U.S. since 2001, especially the abrogation from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), in 2002 (Panda 2018; Roth 2018). We acknowledge that this equipment was already mentioned in a report made by the U.S. Defense Department8 in 2018, about the review of U.S. nuclear posture. The report states that “Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle, and a Putin strongly criticized the U.S. revocation of ABM treaty, announcing in this year statement that his critics weren’t listened at the time, despite of 92 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.3 n. 9 | p. 1-99 | abr - jun/2018 | ISSN: 2525-5266 Russia being the second nuclear power. There are discussions, both in the U.S. and in Russia, on the technical and operational viability of some of these weapons, as well as at what stage the projects are. Other debate is related to when this equipment, now being presented as operational, got ready (Kortunov 2018). This could lead to dangerous rhetoric from the point of view of international security, just like the denial of the existence of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), by U.S. oficers and scholars, drove in the past (Halliday 1983). useless for those promoting these initiatives (Russia 2018, online). We call attention that the ABM defenses had a special focus in the address, especially due to the effort of russian strategic forces to keep MAD with the U.S., guaranteeing nuclear dissuasion. These capabilities pass through the ability to delect and overcome the defense systems of the adversary, in special the ABMs (Fitzpatrick 2018). Each system shows up a new form of russian innovation and were stimulated by its concerns about the increasing Despite Putin`s reiteration of Russia`s position of defensive capabilities by the U.S. related to anti“not pursuing hegemonic and territorial ambitions, missile systems (Eckel 2018; Panda 2018). as well as not having any intention to attack other countries” (Roberts 2018), the NPR 2018 states Theories of Internal Balancing: Emulation, that “Russia’s seizure of Crimea and nuclear Innovation and Offsetting threats against our allies, mark Moscow’s decisive return to Great Power competition” (U.S. 2018b, I). The link between technological transition We point out that, despite the uncertainties that and its systemic effects it`s of main importance for may seem to soften this news, there are signiicant the theories of international relations. Among the points that stem from the address that must be central authors that use this approach, in addition discussed in a broader way. to internal balancing10, we have the works of Waltz (1979), Evangelista (1989), Goldman and Andres Putin describes the development of such (1999), Elman (1999), Resende-Santos (2007), equipment as necessary measures in face of Taliaferro (2009), Horowitz (2010) e Dawood western advances, over the XX century, and the (2013). The present essay prioritizes the ideas and refusal of those countries in accepting peace and concepts utilized by Resende-Santos (2007) in its cooperation with Russia. On contrary, they sought analysis of military innovations11. to siege the country with military bases and ABM systems. The Russian president stated that: The author arguments that, in anarchic and competitive realms, the innovation rate increases I hope that everything that was said today would make in accord to the intensity of the competition12. any potential aggressor think twice, since unfriendly Innovation is understood as the invention of steps against Russia such as deploying missile new practices, unknown previously, or the defenses and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to improvement of existing arrangements, and results the Russian border to become ineffective in military in technological advances and improvements in terms and entail unjustiied costs, making them performance. Being the irst-mover guarantee huge 93 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.3 n. 9 | p. 1-99 | abr - jun/2018 | ISSN: 2525-5266 advantages, but are short-term (Goldman and This is the case that we analyze, especially by the Andres 1999) change in the degree of external threat experienced after the unilateral abrogation by U.S. of the ABM The major variable used by Resende-Santos, and treaty, in 2002. Such withdraw led to a change that impacts the rate, scope and timing of emulation, in the incentive for other actors to improve their innovation and offsetting, is the external threat level capabilities. that a State faces. For doing so the author uses two theories to measure the nature and local changes The Changes in the External Threat Level: of the security environment of the states – internal explaining the causal logic for the new arms balancing and the offense-defense balance. We race also stress out that the external threat level is not dichotomous, but a spectrum continuum with a This section seeks to identify the causal myriad of positions (Resende-Santos 2007). logic between the changes in the russian external level of threat and the subsequent process of When we look at how the states think about and internal balancing developed by the country. The search for innovations, their actions are shown both main argument takes as the deterministic factor for as an action-reaction dynamic, and as a prisoner’s the process being the abrogation from U.S. of the dilemma dynamic. In other words, the magnitude ABM – complain that Putin mentioned explicitly in of behavior changes is a function of the number of its discourse – taken by many as the central pillar geostrategic factors, among which stands out the for the strategic parity (Lukyanov 2018; Russia relative military power of the state, the position of its 2018). assets and weaknesses, the offensive capabilities of the adversary and the viability of the options On what concerns the offense-defense balance, related to the external balancing. The perennial it’s imperative to highlight that even after the presence of some kind of threat, as presented dissolution of USSR, the MAD was sustained13. by the security dilemma, doesn’t mean that it will Under MAD conditions – given the mutual capacity always be the deterministic factor. Changes in the of a second strike – nuclear weapons can mitigate aggregated value of the power balance matter, but the effects of the security dilemma14. Russia, not deine alone the security calculus. It’s crucial hence, always had nuclear dissuasion and the ABM to analyze the kind of offensive and defensive treaty as the core of its security and of strategic capabilities that the actors in the system have, stability in a global level, especially in the period in addition to the other factors presented above of unipolarity15. While the MAD and ABM were the (Resende-Santos 2007). rule and consolidated we consider that the offensedefense balance used to favor defense, that is, As the system becomes more competitive and the Russia (Steff and Khoo 2014). rate of innovation accelerates will depend on how much this power shift is focused on the attacker’s The inlection point in the conditions presented offensive and advantages (Resende-Santos 2007). above came in 2001, with the extinction of the 94 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.3 n. 9 | p. 1-99 | abr - jun/2018 | ISSN: 2525-5266 irst strike (Glaser 2010; Lukyanov 2018; Steff and Khoo 2014). The development and the quest for deploying ABM systems have triggered a security dilemma dynamic, majorly due to the necessity, taken by the U.S. as vital, to achieve nuclear primacy. ABM after the U.S. abrogation. The subsequent intent to achieve nuclear primacy, by the country, in detriment of MAD, came with the development of multi-layer anti-missile defense systems, approved by George W. Bush government on December 16, 2002 (Lieber and Press 2006). Despite the oficial discourse by the U.S. that these systems are defensive-only, its actions were taken by Russia as an offensive attempt to seek primacy. Such interpretation came from the scale of the program, considered by Moscow as far-bigger than the traditional necessities of dissuasion and, if it succeeded, could give U.S. preemptive capacities against Russia (McDonough 2006; Buchan et al. 2003). Final Remarks Some authors argue that this new competition process has been ongoing for several years and what we are experiencing is the resume of the nuclear rhetoric of the darkest days of the USSR-U.S. confrontation. We stress out that, in what concerns the anti-missile defense systems, despite the development of huge increments in the anti-ballistic missile technologies and these maintaining a central role against adversaries without hypersonic equipment, this kind of technology has few effectiveness against the technologies being implemented by Russia16. We spotlight that Russia has long-time concerns about the insistence, by the U.S. in deploying the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. The system is justiied by Washington as being for limited threats-only, especially those linked to “Rogue States”, whilst Moscow fears the degradation of its strategic dissuasive capacities (Panda 2018). It`s not the of this paper to explain the motives that guided U.S. strategists when they launched the program. It is, however, imperative to highlight that the foundation for the initiative was the rejection of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability. “The denial of balance as a vital necessity has eroded the entire global security system” (Lukyanov 2018, online). This is the main argument pointed out in this article, namely, the development of a whole new branch of weaponry that can penetrate anti-missile systems, by Russia, is strongly correlated with the U.S. withdraw from the ABM treaty17. In the absence of a treaty limiting the defense capabilities against strategic missiles – and videlicet, against nuclear strikes – the MAD conditions could not be guaranteed anymore. Therefore, the development of such systems by the U.S., a part of its original In short, besides the defensive proile of the ABM purposes and intentions, triggered an asymmetric technology, what is observed is the opposite, response by Russia. since it breaks with the logic-foundations of MAD. The major objective of the ABM becomes, hence, The conjuncture shows us, then, that, irst it’s to deny the nuclear capacities of the opponent, necessary the establishment of talks in regard increasing the chances of it becoming a target of a to arms-control by U.S. and Russia, preventing 95 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.3 n. 9 | p. 1-99 | abr - jun/2018 | ISSN: 2525-5266 an escalation of the arms-race. What can be inferred by Putin`s address is that he prefers the maintenance of a regime of strategic arms-control with U.S. (Russia 2018). Putin, however, stands out that “Russia cannot consider the goodwill and commitment of the United States as granted” (Russia 2018; Kortunov 2018, online). In the second place, the development of this equipment will make the U.S. be more reticent in joining talks with Russia about arms reduction since it would appear a hand over to a “russian blackmail” by Moscow. The recent measures announced by Trump seems to crave the fast development of these defenses, increasing russian concerns18. The situation seems to lead to a U.S. response seeking to modernize its nuclear arsenals. The military-industrial complex tends to, thus, exaggerate the russian superiority, intending to guarantee better contracts to “protect U.S. from the russian threat”19. Finally, it’s not clear if this administration, in the U.S. will be able to ind a solution for the russian systems via arms race or bilateral dialogue over strategic stability. 96 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.3 n. 9 | p. 1-99 | abr - jun/2018 | ISSN: 2525-5266 Notes 3 For a more extensive debate, see Popov (2018). 4 Hypersonic missiles can be maneuverable and travel at approximately 5,000 to 25,000 kilometers per hour, that is, almost 25 times faster than modern airliners. They have huge maneuverability and unusual light ranges ฀ from few dozens of miles to one hundred miles (Speir 2017). 5 The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known by “New START”, was signed by the former president Barack Obama and former president Dmitri Medvedev. For more information see U.S. (2018a). 6 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. 7 The Russian modernization program also extends to the nuclear triad, producing new ballistic submarines, submarine-based missiles, ICBMs and air-ground missiles (Pifer 2018). 8 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 9 It’s imperative to point out that these technologies are being developed by China and U.S. as well. For an improved discussion, see Brimelow (2018) and Speier (2017). 10 For a more extensive discussion related to internal balancing, see Dawood (2013). 11 We understand, here, that states balance against threats in two ways – or combining them: i) alliance, or coalition, with other states – external balancing – or; ii) mobilizing its social resources – internal balancing (Resende-Santos 2007; Schweller 2004; Waltz 1979). For Resende-Santos (2007), internal balancing happens in three ways: (i) the strategy of offsetting, involving quantitative increasing and reconiguration of human, organizational and technological resources that already exist; (ii) the strategy of large-scale military emulation – comprehended as the systematic and deliberate imitation of technology, doctrine and organization of one country by other – and; (iii) the strategy of innovation, utilized in the present article. 12 That said, the system is an environment of risks and uncertainties that boosts states to seek and adopt, through innovation and emulation, strategies and means to compete more effectively. 13 As pointed out by Lukyanov (2018), in the early 70`s (1972 and 1974) the USSR and the U.S. agreed on limitations to the capacities related to defense against strategic missiles, what meant defenses against nuclear attacks. There was a need to respect strategic parity. The most important thing to detach is that MAD survived the disintegration of USSR (Kortuov 2018). 14 For a critical position to the MAD propositions, see Organski and Kugler (1989). 15 The concept of strategic stability irst appeared in the Treaty between USSR and the U.S. for the Elimination of Short and Medium-Range Missiles (1987) and in the START I (1991). “On June 1, 1990, the leaders of the two countries signed a special joint statement on future talks on nuclear and space weapons and efforts to further consolidate strategic stability” (Lukyanov 2018, online). 16 To see more about the new structure of nuclear competition, see Fitzpatrick (2018). For discussions related to the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles defenses against adversaries with hypersonic technology, see Lamrani (2016). 17 Could be argued, for example, and following the theoretical frame here proposed, that “a new and more effective countermeasure against an existing technology is another form of innovation, and should hence again confer irst-mover’s advantage on the innovator” (Shiping 2010, 233). 18 See (Gronlund 2018). 19 To a view on how the military-industrial complex used the soviet threat and a possible soviet advantage on arms race to allocate resources on the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, see Dall’Agnol (2018). We understand here that the same is likely to occur under this situation, especially due to the fact that “comments by US oficials about Russia and China’s recent gains have led some to believe that the US is currently losing the race” (Brimelow, 2018). 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