Ksenia Yudina, CFA

Want to be a Venture Capital Scout? Scout for Syndicate leads. I’m biased, but I think SPV/Syndicate leads are some of the best connections for VC scouts. As a syndicate lead, I’ve leaned into working with VC scouts the past 3-4 years. It's been a great way to gain unique access to deal flow and many of my most exciting portfolio companies have come from various “scouts”. Given the deal by deal investing strategy and ability to share carry with those who support sourcing & diligence, it’s become increasingly common for syndicate leads to actively partner with scouts and share carry or upside in the SPV. What’s in it for the scout? Deal x deal carry. While there are multiple traditional VC scout models that exist, the syndicate scout model is pretty straightforward. If you source a deal and support diligence, the syndicate lead is going to share some of the carry with the scout, and likely a more meaningful amount than a traditional venture fund. This is of course an SPV, so you are getting carry for the specific deal you sourced and not fund-level carry. A little more background on why the SPV model aligns with VC scout deal sourcing… Syndicate leads are structured (and many times set up) to invest in more companies than a traditional venture fund. In order to consistently bring LPs high quality deals, it makes sense to partner with folks in your network who have strong deal flow. Most times the carry split from syndicates will be more generous than that of a traditional venture fund. Syndicates do not necessarily have a certain number of portfolio companies they can invest in, meaning as long as they are getting access to quality deals that LPs want to participate in, then they will: 1) Be more likely to say yes and run the SPV into that investment and 2) Be more willing to provide a higher carry split, especially if you as a scout show you can repeat this with more future access In summary, if you are going to scout for venture funds, you might as well explore doing so with syndicates and capitalize on deal by deal carry/upside. Disclaimer: If you are scouting deals because you want to get into VC, working with traditional VCs is likely better from a networking standpoint, but if you are scouting to capitalize on carried interest/upside, I think the SPV lead route can be more attractive, and more frequently. -- Interested to see if you are a fit for our new Deal Sheet accredited investor product? Explore Deal Sheet to access 100-200+ of the best SPV startup (pre-seed to pre-IPO) investment opportunities per year. Deals are curated by Zachary Ginsburg & Alex Pattis (deployed > $200M across 750+ SPVs) across 50+ syndicate leads.

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LP Tip #20 out of #50: To re-up or not to re-up A re-up refers to an LP making an additional investment in a fund where they previously invested. Before we dive in I want to share that there are reasons an LP may not to re-up which are not in your control. Here is a short list: ➡️ The LP may have evolved their strategy and needs to scale back the #️⃣ of funds they invested in.   ➡️ The LP was never set up to re-up in the first place. ➡️ The LP could be an individual that found themselves in a cash crunch and overly exposed to venture.  I'm assuming that when you got your investment that the LP explicitly told you they do re-ups. Please do not assume they do. My expectation is also that the LP dug in to properly underwrite the fund. 🏴 Re-ups are not automatic. An LP will have to re-underwrite each fund. The speed of the re-up also depends on how much work was done in the initial investment, who led the investment, level of confidence there existed when that investment was done, and current pipeline of funds. There are 4 flags that may cause an LP to walk away. 1️⃣ Partner Breakups/Changes and Team Turnover:  The biggest risk in Partnerships are whether the Partners will stay together. One LP gave me a framework on how to think through this issue that has stuck with me. Partnership is like a marriage. If one feels there is potential for a breakup, does one believe it will be an amicable breakup? Or, does one believe the spouses will never talk again? If it is an amicable split that is manageable. The Partners can find a way to support the fund. Then the question becomes whether the LP wants to back the Partner/s that remain.  If there is high team turnover. The LP will want to investigate because team stability is used as a proxy for firm sustainability and ability to scale. 2️⃣ Fund Does not Execute on what they Sold the LP:  The LP “bought” something specific and typically it is because they were missing this strategy or wanted exposure to a strategy for the portfolio they were constructing. An institutional LP will invest and write a detailed investment memo flagging all the things you said you were going to do and then go back and compare when you come back to ask for money. If for example you pitched a generalist seed stage fund and you show up asking for money sharing that you invested in deeptech at A that will cause alarm. The same can be said for the number of companies you promised to invest in or check sizes you wrote. If there are big differences LPs will want to know why. 3️⃣ Bad Actions  The fund manager/s does something that is unethical. This is a no go for an LP.  What if the situation is not clearcut? This is different for everyone and requires discussions b/w GP and LP, but most LPs don't want headline risk. 4️⃣ Continuous Underperformance  If it's early days an LP will look at some key indicators to see how you are progressing over time.

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Macro Wednesday's: S&P rose +97bps to 5751 (+21% YTD), while Nvidia gained another +4%, approaching its all-time high, with the Hon Hai CEO citing “crazy” demand for Blackwell. MegaCap Tech outperformed at +2% versus Non-Profitable Tech, which edged up +0.2% (+46% vs. -10% YTD). Interest rates stayed steady, with US/Bund at 4.01%/2.24%. Chinese local stocks fell by -4%, and Bitcoin reached $62.2k. Key events include the FOMC minutes release today, US inflation data tomorrow, and monitoring of Hurricane Milton, a Category 5 storm. JPMorgan is set to kick off the US earnings season on Friday. US Inflation: Analysts estimate a 0.28% increase in September’s core CPI, which would keep the year-over-year rate stable at 3.2%. This estimate accounts for higher used car prices (+1.0%), a further rise in airfares (+0.5%), and continued firmness in car insurance (+0.7%). A slight decrease in new car prices (-0.1%) and a moderation in shelter costs (OER +0.35%, primary rent +0.31%) are also anticipated. AI Developments: AI continues to advance rapidly, with recent innovations from major tech companies. Google’s ‘NotebookLLM’ allows users to upload links or PDFs and receive detailed summaries through the Gemini LLM. Recently added features include audio generation, enabling users to convert PDFs into podcasts. Meta has introduced a video generator that offers more precise control over visual outputs. US Elections: Financial analysis suggests that Trump’s proposed policies could increase U.S. debt by $4 trillion more than those of Harris. Agility Robotics: The company unveiled its new ‘RoboFab’ facility and is conducting tests in Amazon warehouses. Agility is part of a group of robotics companies that are combining advanced battery technology, motors, and sensors with software to optimize robots for human-centric environments. Starlink: The direct-to-cell satellite service received temporary approval from the FCC for areas affected by Hurricane Milton. China Market Update: China has been upgraded to overweight following recent coordinated policy actions aimed at stimulating the economy. The sentiment among some analysts is that current conditions present a compelling opportunity for investing in Chinese equities. US Earnings Outlook: Updated estimates for 2025 earnings project a 5% sales growth, in line with nominal GDP growth (previously 4%). The macroeconomic environment remains favorable for modest margin expansion, with price increases outpacing input costs. Projections now include a 78 basis point net margin expansion in 2025, up from 24 basis points previously. Expectations for the Information Technology sector have been adjusted upward due to a recovery in the semiconductor cycle and continued strength in mega-cap tech. Tesla: A preview of Tesla’s upcoming Robotaxi event on Thursday suggests the possibility of unveiling a prototype for a new vehicle concept, marking the company’s first since the announcement of the Cybertruck in November 2019.

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🔥Here's why micro-VC funds are going to overtake larger GPs ($50mil+) in the next 12 months (and why I believe this is a great play for LPs).🔥 1. Early access= outsized returns. Small checks equals super early access, great upside and outsized returns and a much better and rights for everyone, LPs included. 2. Pro-rata rights. Smart micro-VCs will include this and be able to maintain a stake in their best-performing portfolio companies- giving them the option to continue investing at a later stage. 3. Better operators. Micro-VCs are going to invest early and get their hands dirty and tinker. Case in point, one micro-VC I know are successful entrepreneurs (3x IPOs)- having taken a product from the garage to the stock exchange. Think part investor, part mentor, part CTO. This is invaluable for any founder. 4. More creative. A micro-VC doesn't do it for the management fees- these are negligeable and cover fund expenses and that's about it (see my next point). Therefore it requires being more creative with how and where capital is allocated. 5. Performance over AUM. Given that management fees are not an incentive, micro-VCs focus on portfolio performance rather than assets under management. This creates a much stronger alignment with LPs, especially professional investors and family offices. 6. A bigger portfolio. Imagine writing an average check of $250k for a $10m fund. That's potentially 30-40 startups depending on how much capital is going to be required. So imagine as an LP what a $250K check can get you- a pool of 30 startups versus 1 seed? 7. Democratizes access. Based of the last point, some smaller LPs and professional investors can't access investments in larger VCs- or not on great terms. Smaller micro-funds target a different, more entrepreneurial pool of investors that is truly democratizing, creates co-investment opportunities and much less risk than investing in solely one pre-seed startup for more or less the same ticket size. I'd love to here thoughts from LPs and family offices, as well as micro-VC managers on what your experiences have been!

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VC fund GP: Interested in our fund? Me: How does the fund make money? VC: Exits and liquidity events. Me: I know how, I meant how are you literally going to facilitate those events happening in a timely manner and still getting above market returns within a 10 year fund cycle? VC: Crickets... Raise, allocate and wait is not a VC strategy. Getting money in is easy but to get your money out, there has to be opportunities to do so because you'll have little to no say or control after you allocate.

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2 active fund offerings from the Echelon Fund team who have been killing it ever since their cohort at The Fund School. https://lnkd.in/gVd-dhfY sidecarportfoliofund.com This presentation of Echelon Fund, LLC and Sidecar Portfolio Fund (the “Company”) is for information only and shall not constitute an offer to buy, sell, issue or subscribe for, or the solicitation of an offer to buy, sell or issue, or subscribe for any securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice and is based on publicly-available information, internally developed data, third party information and other sources. The third party information has not been independently verified. While the Company may not have verified the third party information, nevertheless, it believes that it obtained the information from reliable sources and has no reason to believe it is not accurate in all material respects.

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The latest on YC valuations has been making headlines, so here's what I'm seeing as an early-stage fund manager investing at the pre-seed/seed. I’ve spoken to a couple dozen YC companies in the last year, all raising at $15M-$30M valuations regardless of traction or founder background – it could be a 20-year-old with a duct-taped MVP that pivoted eight times in the cohort. Compared to Techstars or other accelerators, that is 2x-6x higher than most valuations. Even for multi-time exited founders, the high bar is generally a $15M valuation regardless of product or traction. That said, YC companies could be considered de-risked due to the network effects of YC and historical data on YC producing ~10% of unicorns. Fundamentally, it makes sense if the valuation is higher because the expectations are that it’s less risky and the future outcome is bigger. There has to be a line drawn between what is fair and excessive. As an investor, I’m willing to pay a premium for opportunities that we believe can produce outsized returns regardless of the cost. Today, single-stage funds struggle to invest in YC companies because valuations are higher and therefore, the ownership is lower. For early-stage funds, without the ability to maintain future dilution, obtaining venture returns while consistently investing in YC companies is harder. The returns start reverting closer to public equities without the risk/reward matching typical venture returns.  For multi-stage funds, typically larger multi-hundred million to billion dollar funds, you can continue buying company ownership as your portfolio companies grow. A $1M-$3M pre-seed check is a drop in the bucket, so larger funds are less sensitive to valuations and look at YC investments as an option to fund a $10M+ check in the future. Whether YC is meant to create these dynamics or not, their newest model, a larger investment that carries an MFN, naturally incentivizes all the YC companies to take on investments at a higher valuation. In turn, this method coincidentally hinders emerging funds or single-stage funds from participating. Was this structured by design to pent-up deal flow for some of the tier 1s and maybe even LPs in the Bay Area? I guess you can index YC if you have a billion-dollar fund…..

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Interesting anecdote contained in a sell-side note (for once, I won’t mention or shame the bank, because this is rather good and exactly what the sell-side should do, rather than projects revenues over the next 40 years…): 𝗯𝗲𝗮𝗿 𝗴𝗿𝗼𝘄𝘁𝗵 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗦𝗮𝗮𝗦 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗯𝗮𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗼𝗻 𝘃𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗼𝗿 𝗽𝗿𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗴𝗴𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻. CIO of tech company "Our focus right now is on eliminating tech debt. For instance, we have multiple Salesforce systems, as SaaS tools have proliferated as departments/business units have acquired them over the years. 𝗪𝗲 𝗻𝗼𝘄 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗺𝗶𝗴𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝗳𝗲𝘄𝗲𝗿 𝗶𝗻𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲𝘀 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗳𝗲𝘄𝗲𝗿 𝘃𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗼𝗿𝘀. Our goal is to eliminate smaller SaaS firms: we had ~750 software vendors, I’ve consolidated down to ~500 and will keep going. 𝗧𝗵𝗲𝘀𝗲 𝗴𝗿𝗼𝘄𝘁𝗵 𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗽𝘂𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘂𝗽 𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗴𝗼 𝗼𝗻 𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿, customers cannot keep spending 20%-30% more. Our Salesforce spending growth is insanity. I use Salesforce as an example but ServiceNow and Microsoft are arguably worse. SaaS pricing went up post-COVID and upon renewal I’m getting stuck with 25% spend increases, and SaaS vendors want me to sign a 3-year deal based on features that they haven’t even proven out yet. 𝗧𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝘀𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮 𝗹𝗼𝘁 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗹𝗶𝗸𝗲 𝘂𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗻𝗼𝘄 𝘀𝗮𝘆𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗻𝗼 𝘄𝗮𝘆. Software companies are going to have to shift to a new model. Over the last few years, we and other customers have implemented more rigorous spend management practices and tools, we now have better spend visibility. 𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱 𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝘀 𝗹𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗿𝗮 𝘁𝗲𝗰𝗵 𝘃𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗼𝗿𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗺𝗼𝗿𝗲 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗮𝗽𝗽𝘀/𝗦𝗮𝗮𝗦 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗻𝗶𝗲𝘀, as they are more likely to have played into the "𝘢𝘥𝘥 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘯 𝘵𝘢𝘬𝘦 𝘶𝘱 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘣𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘭𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴" strategy. Any software company that has leaned into this bundling approach has to be feeling pushback from customers today. The reality is most organizations can't consume or operationalize all the new functionality.” 

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💡Benchmarks in the investment industry serve as a standard for measuring the performance of securities, mutual funds, or investment managers. They provide a reference point for analyzing allocation, risk, and return of a portfolio, enabling investors to make informed decisions. Thanks Peter Walker for keeping us all informed!! Can’t wait for this!! Follow and get on the waitlist for this one! #benchmarks #fundraising #Capitalraise #founders #womenshealth #femhealth #medtech #wellness

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This FT article has a fancy graphic illustrating the layers of debt in private equity, but -- despite my prior post warning about the risks of debt layering in PE -- this article is inaccurate scaremongering. Here’s the key line: “Much of this lending is ultimately underpinned by the financial health of a fund’s portfolio companies. Yet every transaction ends up adding more leverage to heavily indebted businesses, which can make them more vulnerable in a downturn.” This statement is fundamentally incorrect. From the leverage used by General Partners or Limited Partners on their overall private equity portfolios to the use of subscription lines, secondary fund leverage, and leverage by funds purchasing GP stakes—none of these add leverage to the individual businesses or increase their susceptibility to economic downturns. The only mechanism that does add leverage to a business is a dividend recapitalization. However, the alternative is typically the PE firm selling the business to realize its investment, where the acquirer, especially if it’s another PE firm, would likely employ the same amount of leverage. Net Asset Value (NAV) loans may represent leverage on leverage from an LP’s perspective, but they do not increase the portfolio company’s debt or its bankruptcy risk during a downturn. Instead, they merely increase the possibility that the GP might need to sell sooner than desired to repay fund-level debt. Therefore, the only factor impacting a portfolio company’s failure probability is dividend recapitalization. The bank’s expertise is to assess the risk of its debt investment in the company. Whether a GP sells a stake in their management company, an LP sells a stake to a secondary fund, or the fund uses a subscription loan (a short-term loan backed by LP capital commitments to optimize investment IRR by delaying capital calls) to purchase the company—none of these scenarios affect the portfolio company’s ability to weather a downturn. “There should not be a pocket of the market that touches on so much of the economy in such a sizeable way, where we can say, ‘oh there’s leverage,’ and then very few of us can explain what that leverage means and why it might—or might not—be risky,” said Victoria Ivashina, a professor at Harvard Business School specializing in private capital. I can only assume Professor Victoria Ivashina was either unaware of the article’s specifics or, as a private markets expert, she is 'one of a few' (?) who could have alleviated the author’s concerns about this ‘web of debt.’ Moreover, where is the causality here? There is no indication (other than the title of the article) that PE firms are coercing banks into making these loans. The title could just as easily have been “How Banks Have Mired PE Shops in Potentially Depression-Inducing Debt.” Both parties willingly engage in these transactions, and as new debt products emerge, banks are as proactive in marketing them to PE firms as the firms are in seeking them out.

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New or smaller VC, PE or HF manager? AUM less than $50 million? Great Performance? Trying to raise assets? Struggling and failing?   Sounds all too familiar: It’s due to poor or non-existent marketing Let’s get real about raising assets for “sub-institutional” managers, those with AUM between $0 and $50 million. IT’S HARD AND A STRUGGLE.   Raising assets in a crowded, hyper-competitive, complex and complicated market from investors that are risk averse, stringently selective and idiosyncratically demanding is more challenging and difficult than most new and sub-institutional managers understand. The fact is the majority of sub-institutional managers fail to get AUM beyond personal capital long with small amounts from family and friends even when they have exceptional performance. Plainly speaking: There is a lot of BS, hype, propaganda and completely wrong information about marketing and fundraising for small managers with AUM less than $50 million Since 2011, Johnson & Company has specialized in meeting the marketing challenges for "sub-institutional" managers. 25+ years experience, expertise and skill uniquely equips a new or smaller manager with the FACTS and proven structured, disciplined and focused PROCESS supported by independent high-integrity data and research, accurate information, objective insight, expert instruction and frontline intelligence that optimizes marketing process execution to maximize the success, efficiency, economy, expedience and effectiveness of raising assets. If you’re a new or smaller manager, with AUM less than $50 million struggling and failing to raise assets, first get the facts: https://johnsn.com/facts If after your review of the “FACTS”, you’d like a candid, no-nonsense conversation about marketing and raising assets, contact me, I welcome the opportunity. bryan@johnsn.com

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LP Tip #9 out of #50: Start a fund that you are well qualified to execute on Most funds actively invest 3 to 5 years but have a life cycle of 10 or 12 years. In short, managing a fund is a huge time commitment. It is also not the best way to make money. If you are set on launching a fund then work on something you are passionate about, energized by, and that you can execute upon at a high level.  ➡️ When I assess a manager I am looking for what I call GP Fund Fit. I am asking myself the following questions: 1️⃣ Why is this fund manager the right person/s to execute on this thesis and this strategy?  2️⃣ What evidence is there to support they should be working on this specific fund?   Below are two profiles of hypothetical managers that can help elucidate my point. Please note that these examples are also overly simplified and are based on compilations of a few types of managers that have pitched me over the years. ➡️ Fund Manager A: Jay  Jay is a former tech operator at a fintech and now is a first time GP. He is currently raising a $30.0M fund to invest in climate software companies. His interest in climate developed over time but it is evident that he is passionate about the sector and is actively reading research papers and connecting with experts to continue to level up. Jay has a very impressive angel track record but his deals are only in consumer fintech. ➡️ Fund Manager B: Fernanda  Fernanda is a tech operator and former scientist looking to raise $75.0M to invest in climate startups (software and hardware). It is clear that she is extremely passionate about climate because she left her role at a high growth company to focus on learning about the climate space. She then took on a part-time operating role at Random VC, a generalist fund, given their past experience. During her 3 years at Random, Fernanda spent time going deep into the climate space, created a climate operator network, and sourced two climate deals for Random. All this informed her new fund’s thesis, fund size and belief that to make money you can’t only invest in software companies. She is also recruiting a team member that has experience working in climate. Please note that Fernanda also had a limited angel track record but instead spent her time advising founders. ➡️ Which manager would I be more inclined to take a first call with if I had to choose one? I would likely meet with Fernanda to learn more. I like that she spent more time trying to expertise herself in climate. There are still many flags with the fund but if I was forced to pick one she gets the vote. If I happened to bump into Jay I would want to know why on earth he did not start a consumer fintech fund.  

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If you're an emerging fund manager, a robust and efficient co-investment programs is critical to get right. Many LPs expect it. When done right, a strong co-investment program is a win-win-win. However, if done wrong (without a regimented timeline and process) there's a huge margin for error to upset entrepreneurs. I can share a thing or two from what we learned building Fifth Wall: In the early days, we hardwired a co-investment program into our funds, meaning that if you invested a certain amount of capital, you got priority access to co-investment opportunities. This strategy is even more important today than when we started the firm in 2016, because LPs are increasingly looking at venture capital funds as strategic investments to source deal flow. However, there's a huge margin for error if you don't run a regimented process. Without arming LPs with due diligence materials and adhering to a strict timeline, VCs run the risk of irritating the startup in question by delaying closings or not being able to offer an entrepreneur certainty around how much capital they're bringing to the table. Your co-investment program could be hugely successful if you get it right at the outset. I'm very glad we did, and it's something we've continued to double down on as the firm has grown and we've brought more investors and portfolio companies into our network. #venturecapital #lessonslearned

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I recently saw this metric from Carta’s 1Q24 VC Fund Report, which is very concerning. DPI... is nowhere to be found in earlier vintages that probably should start showing DPI. Funding early-stage projects is great, but ultimately, these venture dollars need to exit their investments and pay back their limited partners. That’s where the metric Distributed to Paid-In Capital (DPI) comes in. While managing a fund, we get interim measures during the life of the fund (e.g. IRR, MOIC), but ultimately, “you can’t eat IRR.” If you want to build a lasting venture capital organization, you need to start showing DPI for your fund. Keep in mind that this is traditional VC data from Carta, and is not strictly crypto venture. Crypto venture tends to get liquidity earlier (tokens) and things tend to go parabolic sooner (faster, more unicorns) - but I’d wager that the data here is somewhat similar for Crypto VCs… Not as much DPI as there should be from these earlier vintages. Read the full article, as well as a recap of all the crypto fundraising rounds for August, here: https://lnkd.in/g3eVJ-iF

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Insightful breakdown from my great Partner Omri Amirav-Drory on the simple factors that really separate the top 1% of investors from the rest, and how more operators should become investors! https://lnkd.in/gEiZdT2h

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You are missing the point. You will never get funded by a VC. Why? VC firms want: 100X return on Seed investments. 15X return on Series A funding. 5X return on late-stage funding. All in 5 years. Why? 65% of VC backed companies fail to return their original investment. 50% of VC backed companies fail to return ANY invested capital. They go out of business. You need to show your competition is making these returns and why you will be able to. Saying you can or showing projections won't work. REG D or REG A+ offer a better alternative. Contact us today. Discover your options. We advise companies raising $10 million or more and where to find the money. Are you chasing the VC dream?