Tobias Bernard Switzer

A review of 2024 in DoD Acquisition and Sustainment by William LaPlante, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. Examples of building resilience include: Joint Production Accelerator Cell (JPAC) and its impact on multiple weapons systems including Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Long-Range Anti-Ship Mis­sile (LRASM), Tomahawk, Harpoon, and F-16. Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF), which established with international allies & partners "a distrib­uted maintenance, repair, and over­haul (MRO) network placed closer geographically to the point of opera­tional need." Publishing of the first evert National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) in order to "guide genera­tional change toward a more robust, resilient, and modernized defense in­dustrial ecosystem..." Competitive Advantage Pathfinders (CAPs), "which employ modular open systems approaches and cross-Service integration to streamline development and fielding." Re-energizing nuclear and biodefense capabilities through work by the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and the Biodefense Council (BDC). #defenseindustry #Acquisitionreform https://lnkd.in/eDrypNGy 

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What does C2 feel like from a Civ/Mil point of view? I talked to former NATO Sec Gen Jaap de Hoop Scheffer about what makes Civ/Mil relationships work at the highest levels of an Alliance. The tensions between domestic agendas and international obligations, decision-making in NATO, and how to achieve coherence and agreement in matters of war all get some air time. The conclusion, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that the level of co-operation between politicians and their military counterparts is not something that can be scripted or forced: it depends more on personalities, behaviours, and shared interests than on orders and formal hierarchies. Reflecting on successes and failures, Jaap makes for compelling listening.

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A unique and useful essay from Dr. Lumpy Lumbaca. I thought the title meant "And/Or" as in irregular "and/or" conventional warfare. But on a more serious note, we need to use fiction and even pop culture more often to explain irregular warfare concepts. I wonder if the writers of Andor knew they were employing these concepts? Had they read irregular/unconventional warfare doctrine or was this by chance? Or is unconventional warfare doctrine merely common sense and based on historical actions in the real world. I can say for sure that unconventional warfare is a synthesis of of the history or revolution, resistance, and insurgency, Excerpt: QUOTE: Ultimately, the brilliance of Andor lies in its ability to translate the realities of insurgency and irregular warfare into a compelling narrative set in a galaxy far, far away. It embraces the moral complexities, the internal struggles, and the immense human cost of resistance. By grounding its story in these real-world themes, Andor transcends the genre of space opera fantasy and offers a thought-provoking exploration of the fight for self-determination against overwhelming odds. While entertaining and a Hollywood production, Andor nevertheless captures the real-world elements of modern insurgency and irregular warfare. END QUOTE https://lnkd.in/e_89xK7W

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#US military seeks commercial #space technology for strategic edge: The DoD wants to leverage commercial space technology to enhance #military capabilities, even as officials work to address longstanding challenges in government-industry collaboration https://lnkd.in/d4Dnpjt2

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Navy Needs $$$ and Leadership Congress has complicated budgeting, but the White House and the Secretary of Defense have been less than supportive either in growing the Navy. The call for 3-5% above inflation growth in Navy’s budget is not a new call and a minimum to consider. Clearer goals are needed beyond a fleet of 381 warships sometime next decade. What is realistic before 2027? What will it take? Who is responsible for achieving that goal? The recent Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan is good, but without more forceful leadership little will change, and Navy’s fleet will continue the decades running slow slip into irrelevance. https://lnkd.in/eaEBW_FE

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Check out this Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) article by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park. It proposes critical questions to understand the reasoning and impacts of North Korean troops deployed in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The arrival of these troops in Russia is a reminder of the shifting global alliances that have implications far beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As authoritarian governments like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran grow closer, we’re seeing a challenge to the international rules-based order that has helped maintain peace and prosperity across multiple regions, including the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s decision to bring in North Korean support highlights the lengths it’s willing to go to maintain its position despite internal struggles and manpower shortages. This partnership adds another layer of complexity, hinting at a growing alliance between regimes prioritizing strength over transparency and cooperation. We can better prepare for the impacts on security and stability worldwide by understanding these shifts. #geopolitics #alliesandpartners #freeandopenindopacific

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Good coverage by John Tirpak of our event Tuesday with Air Force Acquisition Chief Andrew Hunter. I'd highlight how the Air Force is trying to change the model for competition, in part through investing in government reference architectures:   “Those vendors who didn’t succeed in Increment 1 were able to take a lot of the work that they had done, a lot of the design teams, and … put them directly against Increment 2,” Hunter added. “So this is not a high stakes ‘win or lose for 30 years’ for industry. If they don’t succeed in one competition, the next competition is right around the corner.” https://lnkd.in/eqanY-D9

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Drawing on lessons from #Ukraine, the #US Army’s recent guidance on the role of #space in land warfare focuses on two objectives: integrating space capabilities into ground forces’ operations & developing ways to interdict adversary space systems. https://lnkd.in/dQvW-8C3

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It will take a combination of this outside the building/private sector leadership AND inside the Pentagon innovation culture to achieve real and lasting change. This is an existential moment for our national security and the private sector is stepping up. Will the Pentagon match their challenge?

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After thinking, "Hey! That's my idea for an article!" (...that I failed to write), I saw that Dan Hough wrote it better than I ever could! Too often US planners either assume that #AccessBasingAndOverflight (#ABO) in #Japan is assured, either because US forces have been based in Japan since the end of WWII or because Japan is closely aligned with the US in its perception of the threat posed by the #PRC across the #TaiwanStrait. While both of these things are true, ABO in Japan is one of the major operational challenges to the US #JointForce in any #TaiwanContingency. While ABO impacts all parts of the Joint Force, it is often felt most acutely by land forces, like #IIIMEF. Whether in exercises during competition or in delivering combat power during conflict, air and sea forces can adjust their operating locations outside of Japan if ABO is late-to-need. Not so with land forces. Land forces like the #Marines face two ABO-based challenges in operating from Japan, dispersing off of concentrated and fixed locations like US and #JSDF bases, and the #PriorConsultation required between the US and Japan before any combat operations are conducted from (or through or terminating in) Japanese airspace and territory. While access to private land in competition is understandably difficult (who wants a bunch of Marines and their equipment traipsing through their fields, after all!), the US and Japan too infrequently rehearse the crisis procedures to grant such access in a conflict. Such rehearsals are essential to identify #policy gaps (and solutions) to procedures that are too slow for a fast-moving crisis and also crucial opportunities for #diplomats, #policymakers, and other #alliance managers to see exactly what the ABO needs are and what the risks and opportunities are of granting such ABO in a timely fashion (or failing to do so). Policymakers are not the only beneficiaries. Tactical and operational commands can use such rehearsals to (in)validate their assumptions about authorities, develop branch plans if such authorities are limited or granted later than expected, and to gain critical insights into national decision-making processes that help tactical commands, like III MEF, ensure their requests for authorities are realistic, timely, and supported with sufficiently detailed justifications and identified risks. Dan provides an excellent summary of such matters and explores what can be done to strengthen the alliance and, in so doing, strengthen #deterrence.

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Bravo!!! It is great to see important leaders paying attention to critical issues. However, it is not just an Air Force and Navy issue--it's all Services plus our critical allies--Japan and others. Also, it's not just aircraft--its ports, personnel and other critical infrastructure (including IAMD). Proper actions with a sense of urgency are what is needed. https://lnkd.in/gHd7MDve

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Missile Technology Control Regime (#MTCR) news… Key phrase: “The NSM directs the interagency to provide increased flexibility for case-by-case review and facilitate support for certain MTCR Category I military missiles, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) systems to certain partners with strong export control systems.” If you’re a space company, this interests you: “In support of the U.S. Space Priorities Framework (USSPF) and the promotion of international cooperation in space, and in accordance with the MTCR Guidelines, transfers of MTCR Category I SLV related commodities, software, and technology will be considered on a case-by-case basis for select and vetted partner space programs and participation in international space programs, whether such programs are governmental or commercial in nature.” ****** Not sure I can assess much from the fact sheet, as the results are always seen in the implemention. #MTCR issues are tough, especially given the technologies involved. But what is true is that the strategic environment is very different now than when the #MTCR was originally introduced. That means we need to adjust our regulatory systems - including the #MTCR - at the speed of the threat. There’s much more work to do on #MTCR issues, especially for America’s closest allies. #MTCR #exportcontrols #AUKUS https://lnkd.in/eC9Qg52N

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July is bustling with conferences, and here's one more to add to your calendar! The Irregular Warfare Initiative is co-hosting the "Intelligence & the Changing Landscape of Irregular Warfare" conference on July 17-18, promising an awesome event. Why should you attend? Check out the program, especially the second topic on the list: CYBERsecurity! It's exciting to see cybersecurity taking the spotlight at this event. Often overlooked in discussions on Irregular Warfare, cybersecurity plays a crucial role in the development and functionality of the technology we use in combat. Understanding the intricate web of systems is vital for effective warfighting. Don't miss the chance to delve deeper into this crucial aspect at the conference! Register here: https://lnkd.in/ga7zUCtC #IrregularWarfare #Cybersecurity #Conference #Defense #Technology #Warfighting #IWICyber Special Operations Association of America

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Today on First Breakfast, a timely guest post from Nadia Schadlow on Reindustrialization: "Reindustrialization is not all about additional government spending. It is about incentivizing new supply and demand opportunities, and unleashing American capital and ingenuity." This is a good heuristic for determining the efficacy of regulation: "For each rule, the administration should ask: Do these regulations attract capital, support innovation, reduce costs, and inject competition? For many of these regulations, the answer will be “no.”" https://lnkd.in/ekuYBc5x

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Stepping into the future with #DISANext - a comprehensive 5-year blueprint from the Defense Information Systems Agency. Spearheading industry change through its 4 fundamentals: Secure Capabilities, Strategic C3, Modernization, and Data. Hear from the visionary himself, Lt. Gen. Robert Skinner about the strategic imperatives of this plan: https://bit.ly/3WcCrb2. Paving the way for advanced #Cybersecurity and #strategy!

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The DoD Directive 5240.01 could potentially be interpreted or misused covertly for operations that might lead to violations of civil liberties, but such actions would still require significant legal and procedural breaches. The document itself emphasizes strict oversight and high-level approval for any intelligence-related activities involving U.S. persons, and particularly for actions involving the use of force, lethal or otherwise. However, covert misuse is always a possibility when there is a lack of transparency or insufficient oversight. Some factors that could theoretically open the door to covert misuse include: 1. Ambiguities in Definitions: The document references complex legal frameworks, including the use of intelligence-related “tradecraft” and activities under Executive Orders like 12333. While these tools are meant for national security, the vague boundaries between intelligence support and active participation in law enforcement operations (especially involving lethal force) might be stretched in covert scenarios. 2. Exigent Circumstances Clause: Section 3.5 allows for immediate action by intelligence personnel without higher-level authorization when there is an imminent threat to life. This provision could be exploited in an emergency situation or under fabricated claims of immediate danger to justify the use of force. 3. Sensitive Support Activities: Some sections of the document refer to sensitive intelligence operations that are governed by other directives, such as DoDD S-5210.36, which governs covert operations. This leaves room for classified operations that may fall outside typical civilian oversight, creating a gray area where covert activities could be conducted without direct accountability, provided they are justified under national security concerns. However, these covert uses would still technically be illegal under U.S. law, as the directive requires compliance with the Constitution and federal laws, including protections for civil liberties. Misuse would likely involve bypassing or ignoring the legal oversight mechanisms outlined in the directive, which could lead to severe legal consequences if exposed. Therefore, while the directive provides tools that could be misused covertly, such actions would not be legally authorized and would rely on circumventing the extensive oversight and approval processes built into the directive. It is an unwise timing if not dangerous down the path towards potential use of the military on American citizens if it is misused or misinterpreted and applied wrongly. It leaves too much ambiguity in its application and does not provide adequate checks and balances upon decision makers. It marks potential further steps towards the breaking of the separation of powers and checks and balances. The timing of it during heightened political divisions and distrust of the federal government is inherently foolish in terms of optics serving only to increase distrust. Othniel Max Daves

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📢 **Attention Army Professionals and 51Cs!** 🌍🚢Understanding Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is crucial for rapid contracting effects in the Indo-Pacific Theater. It's not just the Navy that needs to care about our SLOCs! ⚓️🌊 To support the Joint Theater Distribution Centers (JTDC), we must grasp how our SLOCs connect to our commercial environment. As 51Cs, we must engage industry to harden our commercial environment, thus increasing our SLOCs and building resiliency for our contract effects. 💼🔗 As 51Cs, there are a few key areas we must focus on to support JTDC: 🔸 What supplies need to be there? 🔸 What life support is required? 🔸 Is vertical or horizontal construction required? 🔸 How are things moved inside and outside the JTDC? 🔸 Are other incidental services required?🔸 How does communication work inside and outside the JTDC? All these aspects are extensively covered in the 51C S3/SPO Course! 📚💡 I highly recommend contracting professionals join the next course, starting at the beginning of the next fiscal year. 🚀📅Let's strengthen our capabilities and ensure we're always mission-ready! 💪🇺🇸

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#DYK that there are a variety of supply chain organizations across the interagency? The Department of Energy, Health & Human Services, Department of the Interior & the US Geological Survey, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce, & the Department of Defense all have subordinate units focused on various aspects of #supplychains with different authorities. I think this reflects both how complex & foundational supply chains are to the #economy & national security in the 21st century. Photo below taken yesterday at the Advisory Council for Supply Chain Competitiveness (ACSCC) meeting, where this & other related topics were discussed. #logistics #manufacturing

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