Story of Lehman Brothers In 1844 Henry Lehman, an immigrant from Germany moved to US. He started with a new dry goods & general store. His brothers joined him and gave birth to Lehman Brothers in 1850. LB began its trading with raw cotton. The firm’s operations shifted to New York in 1958. He was responsible for incarnation of grocery and commodity business & his brothers laid the foundation for financial industry. For next 150 years LB underwent various changes & formed alliances and partnerships. LB managed to survive the Great Depression, two world wars, a capital shortage when it was spun off by American Express 1994 in an IPO and the Long term Capital management collapse. LB found an opportunity in newly deregulated financial industry, LB increased its involvement in trading, securitization, derivatives, asset management and real estate. The housing boom of early 2000’s saw involvement of the LB and other firms in collateral debt obligation & mortgage backed securities. LB expanded into loan segment, including subprime mortgages, which were given to borrowers without any documentation with weaker credit who would not have been able to obtain mortgage. In Feb 2007 the stock price of LB reached $86.18. By the first quarter, borrowers started to default on loan mortgages. Top analyst considered it to be an alarming sign for a big disaster. In Mar 2007, the stock saw its 1st drop since five years. LB thought that the borrowers default was for short term. The Stock fell with the credit crisis eruption in Aug 2007 with failure of 2 bear sterns hedge funds, following which LB had to shut offices in 3 states. In Sep 2008 the stock plunged 77% which also took the world market down. LB was hoping that the Korean Development Bank take stake in the LB but the bank kept its decision on hold which lead to a drop by 45% in price. Hedge fund companies began to abandon LB with its fragile financial results. Moody’s Investment services reviewed LB’s credit rating & concluded that the only way to avoid downgrading is to sell majority of LB's stake to a strategic partner. LB was left with just $1 Billion in cash. On Sep 13th 2008 Barclays & Bank Of America made an effort to facilitate the takeover but were unsuccessful. On Mon 15th 2008 LB was declared Bankrupt which resulted in plunging of stock prices by 93%. This day is called as BLACK MONDAY in the history of the stock market. The Sensex declined 50% from its peak in Jan 2008. The crash extended beyond equities, leading to a liquidity crunch. India witnessed reversal of capital inflows as FII's sold off heavily. The impact on Indian economy was less severe due to lower dependence on exports and a substantial contribution to GDP from domestic sources. Banks had limited exposure to the U.S. mortgage market and financially stressed global financial institutions There have been many such cases of default in the world and the world economies are dealing very cautiously to keep strong in such scenarios.
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𝐌𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐖𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐬: 𝐓𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐤 𝐨𝐫 𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭? “Is it better to be feared or to be loved?” asked Machiavelli in his political treatise 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘦 over 500 years ago. Americans, it would seem, have chosen the latter: Last year, US consumers spent about twice as much on Valentine’s Day as Halloween, according to the NRF. Putting that aside, this year’s arrival of Halloween got us thinking about one of the credit market's favorite boogiemen – the “looming maturity wall.” In the aftermath of the GFC, and about every six or seven years since, the high yield bond and leveraged loan markets have become fixated on an approaching maturity wall lurking over the horizon. In each case, these fears have followed a now predictable pattern: Companies steadily chip away at their debt stack by extending loans and refinancing bonds, at which point the market eventually forgets that there ever was an impending “crisis” in the first place. On its face, the 2024/25 maturity wall has followed a similar blueprint. At the end of 2022, nearly $700 billion of U.S. high yield bonds and leveraged loans were set to mature over the next three years. Today, that figure sits below $100 billion as most issuers have successfully rolled their near-dated maturities. However, there have been some notable differences versus past cycles that we think hint at a growing opportunity looking forward. Unlike the 2013 and 2020 maturity wall extensions, many companies have looked beyond the syndicated markets for financing alternatives over the past two years. We estimate that since 2022, $40 billion of syndicated loans have been refinanced with private credit solutions and $65 billion of out-of-court exchanges have been consummated. Undoubtedly, a sizable portion of this activity has targeted maturities through 2025. Higher rates are forcing companies to think more creatively about how they finance themselves and we think this has created compelling opportunities for asset managers who can straddle both the public and private markets and provide bespoke financing solutions. Looking forward, we suspect you will soon hear about the looming 2028/29 maturity wall — and for good reason. Due to the record pace of private equity deployment in 2021 and 2022, the sub-investment grade market will soon have to contend with its largest refinancing lift in history. However, we see more opportunity than risk in this dynamic and expect that the new financing tools that were used to solve the most recent maturity wall will reprise their roles in addressing the even larger upcoming refinancing needs of the market over the next few years. 𝘚𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘤𝘦𝘴: 𝘗𝘪𝘵𝘤𝘩𝘉𝘰𝘰𝘬, 𝘑𝘗𝘔𝘰𝘳𝘨𝘢𝘯, 𝘔𝘰𝘳𝘨𝘢𝘯 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘭𝘦𝘺
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📈📉 Since New York Community Bank (NYCB) announced a 2.4 billion reduction in earnings due to a poor loan review process and other issues, its shares have experienced significant fluctuations. 🏢 #NYCB's growth trajectory, fueled by acquisitions like Flagstar Bank and assets from Signature Bank, underscores its ambition in the banking landscape. However, challenges persist, notably in its commercial real estate mortgage portfolio, impacted by shifting market dynamics. 🔍 According to Professor Michael Imerman on Newsday Media Group, NYCB grew its mortgage portfolio too rapidly: “[NYCB] maybe got too big for its britches.” Although he and other investors are alarmed by their lack of oversight, Imerman assures depositors of the safety of their FDIC accounts. 💰 #UCIMerage Read more about the future of NYCB: https://bit.ly/43b0dpd
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Freedom Bank of Virginia released our Q1 2024 earnings and hosted our Annual Shareholder Meeting yesterday. Our team’s efforts translated into an increase in pretax income of 28% compared to same period in 2023. Strong performance in our Mortgage Division drove an increase in non-interest Income of 24.70% and efforts to manage personnel and overhead expenses translated into a reduction in non-interest expense of 2.89% compared to the same period in 2023. Equally important are the favorable trends in credit quality with a reduction of classified assets and the completed Trustee sale of property of our one large non-performing loan at a price significantly above carrying value. In addition to improving asset quality, we were successful in remixing loans and deposits to protect the net interest margin and reduce operating expenses in an environment where rates are expected to stay higher for longer.
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Debated whether or not to share this. But I thought I would humble myself and share. I’ve never lost money or investor’s money…UNTIL NOW. We bought this beautiful Class A irreplaceable asset in December 2021. It was an incredibly competitive time in the market, and we felt we were getting a good intrinsic value at the time (given the options) since we paid 20% less than replacement cost. For various reasons, we had to get a 3 year bridge loan to stabilize the asset and we planned to refi into HUD 223(f) and hold long term. The lenders underwritten NOI at purchase was $591,344(3.94% Cap). Over our hold period, we were able to push base rents, add in ancillary income such as value trash, CAM fees. Fought property taxes, service contracts and ran the property as efficiently as possibly. At Sale(Sep. 2024), the lender’s underwritten NOI was $779,700. (31.8% increase since purchase) We paid out cashflow distributions the first 9 months. Fast forward 18 months, and $400k of interest free loans that my partners and I made to the property. After much discussion with my partners and investors and running through numbers/options. 1.) capital call exiting investors to do a $1.5-2M cash in refi into agency debt. 2.) Bring on outside capital(preferred equity) at 12-15% that would get paid back before the existing LPs(common equity.) 3.) Ask lender for an extension and hope for perm rates to come down over the next 12 months to permit a cash neutral refi. 4.) Sell for a small loss at 5.4% Cap (3.5% less than we paid) Many of my investors were willing to contribute capital to hold the deal, however after much analysis, we decided that we cut our losses and put our liquid funds into a higher yielding deal. This year alone, we’ve acquired 2 deals that we have doubled the equity($3.5M on one deal and $2.65M on the other within 6 months of owning, stabilizing to a 7.75% YOC on our SLC, Utah asset, and stabilizing at an 8% YOC on our Missoula, MT asset, recovering the loss in gained equity repositioning funds. Almost everyone I see that bought in 2021-2022 is deciding not to sale, but to cash in refi, or bring on outside capital. Is this because you can say, “you’ve never lost money.” Even if it takes 10 years to climb out of the hole, payoff the 12-16% pref equity, to maybe get 100% of original principal back to LPs(50-60% inflation adjusted) At the end of the day, it is a collaborative group decision. But is there something I’m missing, why almost everyone is choosing not to sell for a small loss, but hang on instead, even if there isn’t a clear path to positive returns or even a full return of capital?
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Bank of the Ozarks earnings call….Eerily familiar. A week after my post on Lehman Brothers I’m cringing as I read the quotes from the Bank of the OZK’s latest earnings call. Reminding myself one concept on the eve of Lehman’s collapse…. As soon as you need to convince everyone that you are ok, things are not ok. I am not saying that OZK is doomed by any means. What I am pointing out is that we’re now having discussions about the compositions of bank balance sheets that CEO’s have to justify. What stands out to me is that we are back at the point where CEO’s of major banks are justifying the values or their real estate holdings and seemingly changing strategy to appeal to the market’s concerns on loan concentration: “We're focused on more diversification within the portfolio and less concentration risk” OZK CEO Gleason said. Quick look at the figures: Market capitalization of OZK is just shy of $5bln and the commercial real estate loan book of approximately $33bln (to put it in context Lehman had $23bln at its bankruptcy). And the largest concentration of loans is in Miami, a market that has been highlighted for its slowdown. I am quite certain there is a banking analyst pouring over each loan figuring out the real value today, and that there are some quite serious meetings internally at OZK about the right level of loan loss provisions to take. If they take too much, they raise eyebrows on future expectations for losses - take too little and have to write down later, and they call the rest of the book into question. Life in the spotlight is hard. I know, I have been in that room before. By no means investment advice, just my personal musings. Bill John Dave Mikhail Harald , Ignacio, Chris Suhayl JAKE #RealEstateFinance #RealEstateInvestment #GFC
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In 2006, John Paulson made a profit of '$20 billion' by putting a short on a segment of the mortgage market. In the book 'How to Invest: Masters on the Craft', David Rubenstein delves into the thought process behind the trade in a conversation with Paulson. The segment that Paulson zeroed in was 'BBB' rated subprime mortgage in which a loss of 7% in the pool would wipe out the entire tranche. Rubenstein was surprised that it was that easy, and that Paulson did't have sleepless nights! He was also wondering that no one else ended up putting such a huge short. Paulson said that the bet was asymmetric, in that, one risks 1 percent to make 100 percent; the downside was limited. According to him, others did not see the looming crisis because they extrapolated the past performance of investment grade, mortgage-backed securities into the future and reasoned such securities could never default. This fundamental assumption proved wrong for others, and by questioning this assumption, Paulson made billions. Paulon's hedge fund had been studying the securities and found that the quality of underwriting had deteriorated. Paulson tells Rubenstein: "I think the reason other people hadn’t done it is because there had never been a default of investment-grade mortgage-backed securities. They were viewed as the safest securities next to Treasuries. That was essentially true, up until that point. What others missed was that the underwriting quality of securities had never been as poor as it had been in that period. The fact that they hadn’t defaulted in the past had nothing to do with whether or not the securities being issued would default in the future." I draw two principles, from the reasons provided by Paulson, that can be generalized: a. Question all assumptions that underpin critical decisions b. Avoid the "Turkey illusion", and identify the causes for the trend That's easier said than done!
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The more research I undertake on the US Commercial Real Estate (CRE) market, the louder the metaphorical alarm bells ring in my ears. Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs). One would think that this structured credit product (CLO) was a relic of the 2007 - 2008 Global / Great Financial Crisis era that famously led to the collapse of storied Wall Street investment banks: Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers -- and delivered near death experiences to AIG, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch -- among other financial institutions. Well, guess what? The CRE CLO market has been growing steadily since 2011 -- and its growth has gone into turbo-mode since the 2020 pandemic. To combat a revival in inflation, in 2022 the #Fed went through with the steepest interest rate rise cycle in 40+ years. Unsurprisingly, the CRE CLO market could not withstand the twin risks that materialised as a consequence of the rate hiking cycle: a) surge in cost of borrowing and b) sharp decline in CRE values. Predictably, the CRE CLO market is showing alarmingly visible and growing cracks. Loan delinquencies within CRE CLOs are on the rise -- and these are not just in the CLOs backed by loans on office properties. CLOs loaded with loans on multi-family properties are starting to show similar patterns of distress (delinquencies and defaults). As of March 2024, ~$38 billion worth of US office real estate was in distress. However, in the multi-family space, an estimated ~$56 billion worth of properties are steadily slipping into distress as sponsors are no longer able to cover interest payments from their rental income -- or are unable to refinance maturing loans. Equity markets can ignore the growing fissures in the US CRE market all they want. However, at the pace that these CRE CLOs are turning sour, publicly-listed and privately-owned CRE CLO issuers are hurtling towards a moment of reckoning where billions of dollars of their equity is likely to be wiped out...significantly or completely. In a record-high stock market, the equities of publicly-traded CRE CLO issuers are materially down for the year. I would rather not name names of who the leading CRE CLO issuers are but suffice to say, some of the CRE CLO sponsors are world-renowned alternative asset managers. You can, obviously and easily, figure out who they are. Crucially, the dominos have now been put into motion. They are cascading whether we look towards, or away from, the falling dominoes. It is only a matter of time before the equity and credit markets wake up to the pain coming down the pike. Investors hoping for a Fed rate cut later this year will probably get their wish. But the cut/s will come for all the wrong reasons. GFC 2.0 vibes? #neuron #neuronpartners #neuroninvestors #hedgehawk
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🚀 The Big Short: The Michael Burry Story 🏦 Imagine knowing a dam is about to burst and securing insurance that pays big when it does. 🔍 Seeing Through the System: Unmasking Financial Corruption 🏦 Michael Burry, the man who made one of the largest contrarian financial bets in history. In the lead-up to 2008, he and a handful of other investors purchased securities that would increase in value if U.S. homeowners failed to pay their mortgages. They identified something exceptional happening in the system: 🏦 Banks and Lending: Fueling the Boom and Bust 💥 Lax Lending Practices: Banks gave out loans easily, even to people with poor credit (subprime borrowers), fueling the housing boom. Securitization: They bundled these risky loans into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and sold them to investors, spreading the risk across the financial system. 📉 Credit Rating Agencies: Masking the Risk Inflated Ratings: Agencies like Moody's and S&P gave high ratings to these MBS, often underestimating the risk of default. Conflict of Interest: These agencies were paid by the banks issuing the securities, leading to potential conflicts of interest and compromised ratings. 🚀 Betting Against the Housing Market: The Rise of Scion Capital 📈 Founded by Michael Burry in 2000, Scion Capital consistently outperformed the S&P 500 from 2001 to 2004, amassing $600 million in assets under management. 🔍 Spotting the Subprime Risks: A Bold Move Burry recognized the inherent risks in the subprime mortgage market. He made a bold move by betting against the housing market through his hedge fund by purchasing Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on mortgage-backed securities. 🧠 Facing Criticism: The Visionary's Struggle Although his investors initially considered the strategy reckless and criticized him harshly, Burry's meticulous research and sharp analytical mind kept him steadfast in his belief. 💰 Reaping the Rewards: Profiting Amid Crisis When the housing bubble burst and the subprime mortgage crisis unfolded, the market crashed in 2008. Burry's fund made massive profits from this strategy, generating returns of over 489% for his investors. Burry personally earned an estimated $100 million, while Scion's investors gained an impressive $700 million. 🎬 From Wall Street to Hollywood: The Big Short Part of Burry's extraordinary story was immortalized in the book and later movie The Big Short, where Christian Bale portrayed him. His journey serves as a powerful example of how critical thinking and meticulous research can turn a crisis into a fortune. To gain a deeper understanding of the 2008 housing crisis and Michael Burry's role in it, I highly recommend watching 'The Big Short' on Prime Video. #FinancialCrisis #InvestingStrategy #MichaelBurry #TheBigShort #EconomicInsights
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Why choose between checking and savings when you can have both? A Money Market Account (MMA) is your perfect hybrid solution! Earn interest on your money like a savings account, but with the flexibility to write checks and use a debit card just like a checking account. While MMAs once boasted higher interest rates, today they’re often on par with high-yield savings accounts—so you can enjoy the best of both worlds! Ready to take your savings to the next level? . . . . . #financialadvising #financialadvisor #denver #arvada #denvermetro #denvermetropolitanarea #finance #mortgage #investing #financialfreedom #money #stocks #invest #financialplanning #rothira #femaleowned #femaleoperated #blackowned #blackownedbusiness #denverblackownedbusiness #BIPOCowned #wealth #retirementplanning #diversification #financialliteracy #blackgirlmagic #blackmagic #youngprofessionals #professionals
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Bullish commentary on CRE CLO issuance dynamics from panelists at #ABSEast in Miami this week…. "2024 performance (of CRE CLOs) has given us a lot of confidence," said Harris Trifon, partner and portfolio manager at Lord, Abbett & Co. LLC. "Triple-A CRE CLO bonds started the year with "incredibly cheap" spreads in the low 200s, but they rallied into the mid-150s, according to Andrew Flick, managing director of CMBS trading at Cantor Fitzgerald. Flick said he expects $15bn-$20bn of CRE CLO issuance next year across 20 to 25 deals. Above comments are as covered in linked article by GlobalCapital. The article also notes the trend of increasing reinvestment periods for newly issued CRE CLOs. Last week's Commercial Mortgage Alert noted, "CRE CLO issuers have been stretching the reinvestment timelines of their managed deals lately, signaling that investor demand for such securities is outstripping supply." Related to the improving pricing, Chong Sin wrote in an October 4th J.P. Morgan research note, “the economics for CRE CLO securitizations have also improved as spreads have rallied. Loan spreads, at 1m tSOFR+386 on average, tightened by 14bp since 2023 but the pricing spreads on the offered notes tightened by 62bp to 1m tSOFR+221, improving the economics for the CRE CLO managers materially relative to 2022 and 2023. A continuation of improving economics should lead to an increase in issuance.” #CMBS #commercialrealestate #capitalmarkets
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